Assessing the Delegations

Choosing the Irish Delegates

• When the cabinet convened to select the delegation for the negotiations, Éamon de Valera surprised everyone by announcing that he would not go to London. He provided several reasons for this decision:
  • Since the King, as head of state, would not be attending, De Valera felt it was appropriate for him to also abstain from attending.
  • As the President of the Republic, De Valera believed he should not compromise the symbolic purity of his position by accepting anything less than a full republic during negotiations.
  • By staying in Ireland, De Valera could ensure that all matters would be referred back to him, providing a safeguard for the delegates against British pressure.
  • Remaining in Ireland allowed him to monitor the militant republicans and ensure that they adhered to the terms of the truce.
  • De Valera believed his presence in Ireland was necessary to persuade and manage the more hardline elements within the nationalist movement.
  • Additionally, he thought that if the talks failed, it would be better for a moderate figure like Arthur Griffith to break them off rather than himself, who was seen as a hardliner.
• Opponents argued that De Valera's motives were less noble, suggesting that he realised a full republic was not achievable and did not want to be associated with any compromise.
• Some speculated that De Valera preferred to stay in Ireland to retain control and manage the situation, rather than risk being pressured into agreements he did not fully support.
• Eventually, the delegation was chosen, comprising Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, Robert Barton, Eamon Duggan, and George Gavan Duffy.
• De Valera's reasoning for this selection was that if the talks went badly, Griffith and Collins could be used as "legal padding," giving the delegation some leeway in negotiations.
• However, De Valera did insist that all agreements reached should be referred back to Dublin for approval before being finalised.
• De Valera also appointed Erskine Childers (Barton's cousin) and John Chartres as secretaries to keep him fully informed of the progress.
• Childers, who was known for his strong republican views, was also tasked with advising Barton, given Barton's relative inexperience in such high-stakes negotiations. Despite this, Griffith, who disliked Childers, limited his influence.
• The Dáil instructed the Irish delegation to prioritise the restoration of Irish unity and the establishment of a republic.
• They were also directed to offer external association with the British Empire as a possible compromise. However, only De Valera fully grasped the concept of external association, and the delegates struggled to explain it effectively in London.
• The delegates were also told that if the talks broke down, they should do so over the issue of Ulster rather than broader questions of independence to ensure they retained international sympathy.

The British Delegation

• Meanwhile, the British cabinet selected their delegation, including David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill as Liberals, with Austen Chamberlain and Lord Birkenhead representing the Conservatives.
• They were joined by Sir Hamar Greenwood, Sir Gordon Hewart (both Liberals), and Sir Laming Worthington-Evans (Conservative).
• The British delegation had two primary objectives:
  • They aimed to ensure that Ireland remained part of the British Empire and continued to swear allegiance to the Crown.
  • They sought to protect the interests of the unionists, particularly in Ulster.
• Lloyd George was adamant that if the talks failed, the breakdown would be on the issue of the empire, positioning the British as having offered a reasonable compromise.
• He was concerned that Ireland was the only country seeking to leave the empire, which was a significant threat to British unity.
• While other dominions were content with their status, Ireland's demands posed a unique challenge.
• During the talks, both sides had to consider the unionist position carefully. Sir James Craig kept the unionists informed of developments, ensuring their interests were protected.
• Most of the Irish delegation arrived in London on 8 October 1921 and stayed at 22 Hans Place. Collins and his bodyguards arrived a day later, staying at 15 Cadogan Gardens.
• On 11 October 1921, the Irish delegation began formal negotiations at 10 Downing Street. The two delegations were markedly unequal in experience, which added to the complexity of the talks.

Comparing both Delegations

It is well-documented that the British delegation was a much better and more experienced outfit than the Irish delegation. However, it would be foolish to write such an elementary and nondescript answer in an essay or exam situation. Here are a number of reasons why the British delegation outmatched the Irish in so many ways… in more detail.

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• Experience and Expertise: The British delegation was composed of seasoned politicians and experienced negotiators, including David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, who had extensive backgrounds in high-stakes diplomatic discussions. In contrast, the Irish delegation, while politically committed, lacked similar experience, particularly in international negotiations.
• Political Influence: The British delegation had the full backing of the British government and significant influence in international affairs, which gave them a stronger negotiating position. The Irish delegation, despite representing a popular mandate, was operating from a position of limited global recognition and weaker diplomatic clout.
• Cohesiveness: The British delegation was relatively unified in its goals of maintaining the integrity of the British Empire and protecting unionist interests. The Irish delegation, on the other hand, was divided internally, with differing views on key issues like the acceptance of dominion status versus full independence.
• Support Networks: The British negotiators had immediate access to extensive support networks, including legal advisors, civil servants, and intelligence resources. The Irish delegation, despite having secretaries like Erskine Childers, lacked the same level of institutional support and resources, making it harder to respond quickly to British proposals.
• Strategic Preparation: The British delegation had well-defined strategies and contingency plans, particularly around key issues like the status of Ulster and dominion status. The Irish delegation, despite their commitment, had less clear strategies and often had to refer back to Dublin for decisions, which slowed their response time.
• Negotiation Style: The British delegation was known for its assertive and sometimes ruthless negotiation tactics, honed through years of empire-building and diplomacy. The Irish delegation, particularly figures like Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith, were relatively new to such intense diplomatic pressure, which placed them at a disadvantage.
• Perception and Power Dynamics: The British saw themselves as dealing from a position of power and were prepared to dictate terms, especially on critical issues like loyalty to the Crown and the empire. The Irish delegation, though determined, was perceived as coming from a position of rebellion, making their demands seem more like requests rather than equal terms.
• Public and Media Relations: The British delegation had greater control over how the negotiations were presented to the public and international media, shaping the narrative to their advantage. The Irish delegation had to contend with being portrayed as rebels and had less influence over public opinion outside Ireland.